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BIOLOGY FOR FEMINISTS
KATHARINE

K. BAKER*

INTRODUCTION

Sociobiology,' evolutionary psychology,2 biobehavioralism, 3 evolutionary biology, 4 or just biology.5 Call it what you will, it is as big
news at the end of the twentieth century6 as it was at the end of the
nineteenth, when the world was just beginning to appreciate Charles
Darwin's Origin of Species.7 In the world of this resurgent discipline,
rape is all about sex, marriage is all about one-sided dependence and
motherhood is all about exploited labor. Phrased as such, it is not
hard to see why many women shun the sociobiologist's world. It is a
violent, harsh, and altogether horrific place for women to be. Upon
further examination though, it is a world that feminists well recognize.
Indeed, it is a world we have been describing for some time now.
There are legitimate reasons to question the method and findings
of sociobiology, 8 but in this Essay I will suggest an alternative
strategy: embracing biology, at least as a strategic device, so that we
may reveal the wholly inadequate job that the law has done in
* I would like to thank Sita Balthazar-Thomas, Anita Bernstein, Owen Jones, and
Jennifer Wriggins for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. I am particularly indebted to
Ms. Balthazar-Thomas, whose passion, dedication, and good cheer are a constant source of
inspiration and whose research assistance is simply unparalleled.
1. See Amy L. Wax, Against Nature- On Robert Wright's The Moral Animal, 63 U. CHI.
L. REv. 307 (1996) (book review).
2. See ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL (1994).
3. See Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and
Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REv. 827 (1999).
4.

See FEMINISM AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY: BOUNDARIES, INTERSECTIONS, AND

FRONTIERS (Patricia Adair Gowaty ed., 1997).
5. See Randy Thornhill, The Biology of Human Rape, 39 JURIMETRICS 137 (1999).
6. For a list of just some of the recent literature applying biological principles to law, see
Aspects of Biology, Evolution, and Law (visited Jan. 29, 2000) <http://www.law.asu.edu/jones/
UsefulSources.htm#Aspects> (compiled by Owen Jones).
7. CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).
8. See Stephen Jay Gould, Sociobiology and the Theory of Natural Selection, in
SOCIOBIOLOGY: BEYOND NATURE/NURTURE? 257 (George W. Barlow & James Silverberg
eds., 1980); Zuleyma Tang-Martinez, The Curious Courtship of Sociobiology and Feminism: A
Case of IrreconcilableDifferences, in FEMINISM AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra note 4,
at 116, 116-43.
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controlling nature's horrors. 9 For years feminists have been
describing a world in which sexual violence is pervasive, marriage is a
Faustian and dangerous bargain for women, and caretaking is a huge
amount of usually unrewarded work. This is the world that the
biologists describe also. If the biologist's description is more
frightening than the feminist one, it is only because of the common
but unnecessary presumption that, because the world is that way, it
must stay that way. No biologist believes this.10 How we act is a
complex function of both genetic composition and social
environment. Indeed, prominent evolutionary biologist Timothy
Goldsmith suggests that it is meaningless to try to determine the
extent to which any given human action is genetically or culturally
determined.,, Richard Dawkins, one of the most important figures in
modem evolutionary theory, writes that
it is a fallacy-incidentally a very common one-to suppose that
genetically inherited traits are by definition fixed and unmodifiable.
Our genes may instruct us to be selfish, but we are not necessarily
compelled to obey them all our lives.... [H]uman society based
simply on the gene's law of universal
ruthless selfishness would be a
2
very nasty society in which to live.'
Biologists do not tell us that genes necessarily determine our

behavior; they tell us how genes can strongly influence our behavior.
It is up to social constructions of morality, equality, and justice to
provide a counterinfluence that makes the world a place in which we
want to live.
Therein lies biology's attraction to feminists. By laying bare the
harsh reality of nature, it forces us to embrace our normative
convictions. Biology, along with Catharine MacKinnon, belies the
assumption that rape is totally different than sex. 13 Biology, along
with Mary Becker, refutes the naive presumption that men's and
9. What biologists call nature, feminists tend to call patriarchy. See infra text
accompanying notes 13-15. The normative and policy prescriptions offered at the end of this
Essay can be drawn regardless of which label one chooses. In other words, one can reach
feminist conclusions wholly apart from biology. My goal in this Essay is to demonstrate that
feminist conclusions can follow whether or not one endorses sociobiology.
10. As Barbara Smuts explains, "[Miany people incorrectly assume that to attribute an
evolutionary explanation to a behavior is equivalent to concluding that the behavior is fixed and
cannot be changed.... [E]volutionary analysis does not imply behavioral immutability."
Barbara Smuts, The Evolutionary Origins of Patriarchy,6 HUM. NATURE 1, 5 (1995).
11. TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE: FORGING
LINKS BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR 87 (1991).
12. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 3 (1989).
13. CATHARINE A. MACKiNNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 174
(1989).
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women's interests coincide, even in marriage. 14 Biology, along with
Martha Fineman, makes clear that mothering is work; it is work done
predominantly by women, and fathering has remarkably little to do
with parenting.15 What feminists call patriarchal culture, biologists
call nature, but whatever it is called, anyone with any moral
sensitivity can readily see that it is an altogether inferior, unjust, and
undesirable place to be. And as biology makes plain, it is up to us to
change it.
In the first part of this Essay, I give a brief primer on
evolutionary biology. In Part II, I explore how the biological
perspective challenges the legal constructions of rape, marriage, and
parenthood. The law draws bright ines between rape and sex and
between public and private. These lines make no sense to biologists
and little sense to most feminists. Meanwhile, the law has (at least
recently) refused to draw the line between motherhood and
fatherhood that most biologists and many feminists insist exists. In
Part III, I explain how the biological perspective both supports
feminists' reforms and cries out for stronger normative action.
As written and interpreted now, the law may reflect a normative
vision, possibly even a feminist normative vision. We may want it to
be obvious that rape is different than sex. We may want marriage to
be an interdependence shared by two equals. We may want
parenthood to be a nongendered commitment to caregiving. But the
law does not effect these changes simply by declaring them so. If our
laws are to make sense, we must change the world in which they
operate. A biologist's perspective forces us to recognize how much
we have to work to (re)construct the world in which we want to live.
I.

BIOLOGY'S STORY

To the sociobiologist,'16 a huge amount of what we do,
particularly how we behave with regard to the opposite sex, stems
from our unconscious desire to reproduce.17
We are here to
14. Mary E. Becker, Politics, Differences and Economic Rights, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
169, 169-90.
15. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).

16. Throughout this Essay, I essentialize "the biologist" and "the sociobiologist." I do this
because a complete and nuanced analysis of the various strands of evolutionary biology is well
beyond the scope of this Essay. I believe the "essential" version I offer here adequately
incorporates those biological findings that are most relevant for feminist legal reformers.
17. See DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 7. Sometimes people's desire to reproduce is fully
conscious, of course, but a crucial component of evolutionary theory is the recognition that

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:805

reproduce, and reproduction requires an expenditure of resources.
To produce an offspring, an individual must at least do the work
necessary to produce the gamete (egg or sperm) that will contribute
half of that offspring's genetic material. Unfortunately for human
18
females, offspring are not made by gametes alone.
As with any species that reproduces sexually, fertilizes internally,
and produces live young, the parent that carries and nurtures the
fertilized embryo must invest substantially even after the embryo is
fertilized. The other parent need not so invest. It may be in a
nongestating parent's reproductive interest to invest, for instance, if
the mother needs food or protection in order to successfully nurture
the offspring, but food and protection, unlike in vitro nurture, can be
provided by a nonbiological parent. 19 If a man knows that someone
else will help provide for the offspring he has already sired, he
maximizes his reproductive potential by leaving the first mother and
siring other offspring with a different mate. 20 Moreover, because a
male, unlike a female, is never 100% sure that a given child is his
own, any inclination he has to invest in a child must be discounted by
the chance that the child is not his. If he spends his resources
investing in some other male's genetic

material, he will be

21
contributing to someone else's, not his own, reproductive success.
These two factors, the availability of other means of support and

paternal uncertainty, make men substantially less likely than women
behavioral predispositions may come to thrive regardless of whether the individuals
demonstrating those behaviors are conscious of why they are behaving the way they are. Thus,
men may be motivated to rape because they want to reproduce, even if they have no conscious
desire for children. See infra note 66; see also Jones, supra note 3, at 827-935. Women may be
attracted to high status males because those males will be best able to provide for offspring, but
the women may not consciously experience their attraction as having anything to do with
offspring.

See DAVID M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES FOR HUMAN

MATING 25-27 (1994). Behaviors come to thrive because the behaviors themselves are
reproductively beneficial, not because the individuals demonstrating those behaviors desire to
reproduce.
18. In fairness, some women may not consider gestational labor unfortunate; they may, at
least consciously, consider it a privilege. Those women might be pleased to realize that, even if
offspring were made by gametes alone, females would invest more than males because females
expend more resources in producing one egg than males do in producing one sperm. See
DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 141-42.
19. Reproductive technologies like surrogacy are changing many of these premises as they
change the contexts in which evolutionary processes work.
20. See DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 146-48. Again, consciousness is unnecessary. See
supra note 17. A man need not be aware that someone else necessarily will provide for his
offspring before he abandons them. A predisposition to leave will survive as long as other
providers or caretakers come forward, thus allowing the paternally abandoned offspring to
survive.
21. See WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 66 ("Not long for this world are the genes of a man who
spends his time rearing children who aren't his.").
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to invest in caretaking. They also make men substantially more likely
to diversify their mate choice.12 The reproductive consequences of
diversifying are all positive for men. Even if the offspring produced
by such dalliances are unlikely to succeed because of a dearth of male
support, at least they have some chance, and the male loses almost
nothing (one ejaculation) in the reproduction effort.
In contrast, a female who tries to diversify her mate choice is
forced to expend considerable resources in the reproduction effort. If
her egg is fertilized, she necessarily must invest all of the resources
involved in gestation. 23 Because of this greater initial (and minimum)
investment, 24 a female sinks much more into each child than does a
male. A lost child is therefore more of a loss to a female than it is to a
male. Moreover, a female who is left without any male help to
support a child is at great risk of losing that child.21 Therefore,
females try very hard to mate with males who will help them in
supporting the child. 26
Most evolutionary biologists believe that it is because of the
incentives males have to abandon their young that females choose
their mates very carefully. 27 Females want to make sure that they are

mating with men who will help provide resources during pregnancy
and thereafter. Although recent feminist sociobiology work has

22. See DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 146-47. There is "evolutionary pressure on males to
invest a little bit less in each child, and to try to have more children by different wives." Id. at
147; see also ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 260-62 (1985).
23. The availability of abortion has not been prevalent enough for long enough to have
brought about any significant evolutionary change in this regard. See Jones, supra note 3, at 849
n.75.
24. For more on the differences between male's and female's minimum parental
investment, see id. at 849-50.
25. She is at risk for two reasons. First, children and pregnant females must have resources
and protection if they are to survive. The interdependence that marks human community, see
Smuts, supra note 10, at 15-17, makes human females more dependent on others than are other
primate females. Second, in many species, if a female is pregnant with or has just given birth to
a child whose father has abandoned them, there is a significant likelihood that another male,
who wants to mate with the female, will kill the child so as to free the female up to produce his
own offspring. For the extent to which infanticide plays a consistent and pervasive role in
reproductive strategies of all animals, including humans, see INFANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND
EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES (Glenn Hausfater & Sarah Blaffer Hrdy eds., 1984).
26. If a female is partnered with a male who will provide for any offspring, regardless of
that offspring's paternity, then she has an incentive to find a different sexual mate who has
desirable qualities that her providing partner does not have (better size, symmetry, etc.). This is
a dangerous strategy, though, because, if the male partner discovers that the offspring are not
his own, he may abandon her or harm the offspring. See supra note 25.
27. See, e.g., JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 499500 (6th ed. 1998); MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN
NATURE 180-81 (1993); TRIVERS, supranote 22, at 215-19.
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questioned the ubiquity of the choosiness model, 28 much research still
supports the notion that females will be more discriminating in mate
choice than will males. 29 Luckily, female searches for males who are
willing and able to contribute resources to their offspring are not
usually in vain. Because in some species (including humans) there are
reproductive benefits to high male parental investment, males who
develop a tendency to provide resources to their offspring meet with
more reproductive success than males who do not °
Females benefit from this male parental investment, but it comes
with its own cost. The tradeoff to females for having males who
provide is having males who insist on safeguarding their investment.
Men want to make sure that they are providing for their own, not
someone else's children. Men secure their investment by controlling
women's sexuality. As evolutionary psychologist David Buss writes,
"In a cross-cultural perspective, the ways in which men attempt to
control women's sexuality is nothing short of bewildering. '' 31 In
humans, this male control manifests itself in practices ranging in
severity from female genital mutilation to who takes whose last name
in marriage. In other species, it manifests itself in a variety of
different behaviors, including male bank swallows, who never let a
fertile female partner out of their sight, and male zebra finches, who
attack females who have been exposed to other males. 32 Psychologists
Margo Wilson and Martin Daly conclude that, in controlling women's
33
sexuality, human men come to view women as chattel.
[Mien lay claim to particular women as songbirds lay claim to
territories, as lions lay claim to a kill, or as people of both sexes lay
claim to valuables.... [RIeferring to man's view of woman as
"proprietary" is more than a metaphor: Some of the same mental
28. See Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Empathy, Polyandry, and the Myth of the Coy Female, in
FEMINIST APPROACHES TO SCIENCE 119, 119-20 (Ruth Bleier ed., 1986). Hrdy points out that
many female primates mate while pregnant and actively solicit males from outside their troop.
Id. at 140. Based in part on this data, she suggests that mating for many females, particularly
females mating with multiple partners, may be about something other than just providing
offspring with an optimal mate or securing resources. Id. at 128-29. It may be about
encouraging a variety of different males to tolerate and invest in all offspring. See id. at 129.
29. See, e.g., TRIVERS, supra note 22, at 214; David M. Buss, Sexual Conflict: Evolutionary
Insights into Feminism and the "Battle of the Sexes," in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT 296, 307 (David
M. Buss & Neil M. Malamuth eds., 1996); Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An
Introduction andApplication to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1117, 1145 (1997).
30. See WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 58-59.
31. Buss, supra note 29, at 298.
32, See TRIVERS, supra note 22, at 262-65.
33. Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Chattel, in THE
ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 289,289

(Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992).
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algorithms are apparently activated in the marital and mercantile
spheres.3
In a variety of primate species, females who are not claimed as
property by males are vulnerable to male aggression. Sometimes this
male aggression is itself sexual coercion-i.e., rape. "Among wild
orangutans, most copulations by subadult males and nearly half of all
copulations by adult males occur after the female's fierce resistance
has been overcome through aggression. ' '31 Captive male chimpanzees
36
and lowland gorillas also use aggression to force females to copulate.
Other male on female aggression is best described as indirect sexual
coercion. Male chimpanzees will often become physically aggressive
with females when the female's estrous swelling begins. 37 The male
chimp does not need to use force during the sexual act itself because
he has already successfully communicated his power to the female.38
Jane Goodall posits that, unless he is crippled or very old, a male
chimp can almost always force a female chimp to mate.3 9 Male rhesus
40
monkeys are also physically aggressive towards females in estrous.
Male Hamadryas baboons, who live in groups with several other
females and offspring, use neckbites to keep their females from
wandering off in the direction of other males. These neckbites rarely
break the skin, but their symbolic import is not lost on the females. 41
Females respond to these aggressive displays with a variety of
counterstrategies. They can flee. Before the aggression starts, they
can try to mate with a high status male who will then protect them
from other males. 42 They can try (usually unsuccessfully) to fight off
the aggression. 43 If they have been coerced into sex by a male who
will not or cannot provide for the prospective offspring, they can try
34. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 72 (quoting Margo Wilson and Martin Daly).
35. Barbara Smuts, Male Aggression Against Women: An EvolutionaryPerspective,3 HUM.
NATURE 1, 5 (1992).
36. See Barbara B. Smuts & Robert W. Smuts, Male Aggression and Sexual Coercion of
Females in Nonhuman Primates and Other Mammals: Evidence and TheoreticalImplications, 22
ADVANCES STUDY HUM. BEHAV. 1, 6 (1993).
37. See JANE GOODALL, THE CHIMPANZEES OF GOMBE: PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR 444-48
(1986).
3& See id. at 446-48.
39. Id. at 481.
40. See Smuts, supra note 35, at 4.
41.

See HANS KUMMER, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF HAMADRYAS

BABOONS 36-37

(1968).
42. See Sarah L. Mesnick, Sexual Alliances: Evidence and Evolutionary Implications, in
FEMINISM AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra note 4, at 207, 217.
43. This is the strategy female orangutans often use. See Smuts & Smuts, supra note 36, at
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to mate again, quickly, with another male whom they hope will
provide for the prospective offspring.44 They can also try to bond with
other females. 45 The absence of female bonds renders females
vulnerable. Females in patrilocal societies, who live separated from
their kin, and females like orangutans, who live solitary lives, are
particularly susceptible to male sexual aggression. 46
The above suggests that the gender-dynamic story for primates
(a class to which humans belong) is not a pretty one. It is a story in
which physical aggression and sexual coercion are dominant themes.
It is a story in which females struggle to do the best they can but are,
by nature and physiology, left terribly vulnerable to male selfishness
and physical strength. Heterosexual unions in these situations are
best seen as arrangements in which a female agrees to relinquish her
own autonomy to a male in return for (1) his gamete, (2) resources
that help the female and her offspring survive, and (3) protection
from aggression by other males. The arrangement has everything to
do with children, little to do with privacy, everything to do with
female (but not male) fidelity, 47 and nothing to do with a unified and
shared identity.48
As Barbara Smuts has cogently argued, however, that story alone
does not adequately explain the extent of patriarchy in the human
species. 49 In other species, male bonding (which is critical to the
maintenance of gender hierarchy) usually breaks down in competition
over females. Male bonding evolved in human males, however,
because it greatly facilitated efforts to compete with other groups of
humans. Once men learned how to protect their bonds between each
other, even as they competed with each other for sexual access to
women, they greatly enhanced their collective ability to control
women. In addition, the unique interdependence of humans, which
44. See id. at 12-15.
45. See id. at 17-18; see also Amy Randall Parish, Female Relationships in Bonobos (Pan
Paniscus): Evidence for Bonding, Cooperation, and Female Dominance in a Male-Philopatric
Species, 7 HuM. NATuRE 61, 61-66 (1996).
46. See Smuts, supra note 10, at 11.
47. Evolutionary theory suggests that, to the extent that females care about male infidelity,
they do so only out of fear (conscious or not) that the male's involvement with another female
will drain resources from her own children. Females therefore are more concerned with their
mate's emotional involvement (because it suggests he will really provide for her). See Bruce J.
Ellis & Donald Symons, Sex Differences in Sexual Fantasy: An Evolutionary Psychological
Approach, 27 J. SEX. RES. 527, 546-47 (1990). Males are concerned about their mate's sexual
involvement (for fear that they will be conned into providing for offspring that is not their own).
48. The shared identity model is an ideal that many propose for human marriage. See
MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 94-95 (1993).
49. Smuts, supra note 10, at 13-15.
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requires all of us to rely on each other for resources, allowed men to
centralize their power. All female primates want resource help from
males, but unlike other female primates, human females (with or
without their offspring) cannot survive on their own. Smuts suggests
that
male-male alliances and male control over resources interacted in a
positive feedback loop over the course of human evolution. The
prior existence of male cooperation... facilitated male cooperation
in hunting and in controlling the results of the hunt. The possibility
of controlling resources, in turn, probably increased the benefits to
males of forming alliances with other males.. .. 50
In addition, Smuts argues that the development of language allowed
for the creation of ideologies that greatly facilitated the perpetuation
of male dominance. Male-centered language systems and ideologies
are, according to Smuts, an "extension and elaboration" on
prelinguistic forms of male control.',
If Smut's hypothesis with regard to the origins of patriarchy is at
all accurate, it suggests that patriarchy is natural and remarkably
effective. It suggests that men have been able to channel physical
power and biological circumstance into social control. With that
social control, they have been able to exacerbate the sexual power
differential inherent in nature. The law, as an instrument of social
control, is likely to play an important role in this scheme. In the next
Part, I will focus on the law's relationship to sex, marriage, and
parenthood. All are concepts at the core of biology's story and are
institutions about which feminists are vitally concerned.
II. LAW'S STORY
Although sex, marriage, and parenthood are subjects of common
interest to legal scholars and biologists, the legal and biological
understandings of these subjects are quite distinct. Legally, sex and
rape are very different; one gets constitutional protection while the
other is a crime. 52 In biology, the distinction between rape and sex is
far less clear. Legally, marriage is seen as a unity created by two
individuals who commit to each other emotionally and financially in
50. Id. at 15-16.
51. Id. at 19.
52. Throughout this Essay, I use the word "sex" to refer to heterosexual intercourse. This
is a very narrow and unrepresentative definition of sex. For the great majority of Americans,
sex often involves practices and patterns that have nothing to do with heterosexual intercourse,
see generally ROBERT T. MICHAEL ET AL., SEX IN AMERICA 132-68 (1994). but it is the
potentially procreative aspects of sex that are particularly important to biological analysis.
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order to form a separate entity. In biology, pair-bonding is a binary
relationship with exchange at its core. Legally, at least in the past
twenty years, parents have been parents and their genders have had

an insignificant effect on their rights and responsibilities as parents.
In biology, motherhood, because it necessarily involves so much more
risk and so much labor, is an altogether different endeavor than
fatherhood, which requires only a (very inexpensive) genetic
contribution.5 3 This Part explores each of those distinctions in more
depth.
A. Sex and Rape
A voluntary heterosexual encounter is, as far as the law is

4
concerned, an intensely private affair. It cannot happen in public.
Decisions regarding its procreative potential, i.e., birth control,

cannot be regulated by the state.5 The Supreme Court has suggested,
though never decided, that the law has no place regulating the exact
nature of heterosexual activity, 6 and forty-nine states refuse to
entertain contract claims in which sexual activity forms any part of the
57
consideration.
Once there is an allegation that a sexual encounter is
involuntary, though, privacy disappears. The existence of involuntariness or duress or force or whatever it is that makes sex rape and
not sex 58 completely changes the law's relationship to the act. Rape is
53. Compared to many other primates, humans do demonstrate a high level of male
parental involvement, but male involvement is still significantly less than female involvement.
See WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 57-59.
54. For a sampling of fornication statutes, see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-8 (West
1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 18 (West 1999); WISc. STAT. ANN. § 944.15 (West
1998). All of these states prohibit open and notorious sexual activity.
55. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
56. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986). The statute at issue in Bowers
prohibited all forms of sodomy, but the Court chose only to address the question of whether
"the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy."
Id. The Court's focus on the history of homosexual prohibitions leaves open and brings into
question the constitutionality of bans on heterosexual sodomy.
57. Prostitution is legal only in Nevada, and all other states refuse to enforce contracts for
sexual services. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976) ("[E]xpress
agreements will be enforced unless they rest on an unlawful meretricious consideration.")
(emphasis added).
58. There are a myriad of definitions for rape and sexual assault. For instance, in
Pennsylvania, intercourse "without consent" is "indecent assault," but the statute does not
define "consent." See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3121, 3126 (West 1996). California has
eliminated the "without consent" requirement and instead relies on the presence of "duress" to
make the sexual act a crime. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(7)(b) (West 1999).

20001

BIOLOGY FOR FEMINISTS

not only illegal, "[s]hort of homicide, it is the 'ultimate violation of
self."''5 9 As a New York court framed the distinction: "Rape is not
simply a sexual act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is
a degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the
victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic
harm." 6 Because it is degrading and violent and causes lasting
physical and psychic harm, the law has every right to prohibit it.
But what is it that makes rape degrading, violent, and
dangerous? The law calls rape evil and describes why it is evil but
never really explains why it is different than sex. 61 The voluntary acts
of women who pose for pornography magazines are degrading, as are
the jobs of many sanitary and domestic workers. Many voluntary acts
of sadomasochism are violent, as is the National Football League.
Sexually transmitted diseases have always made sex physically
dangerous, and the emotional overlay implicit for most people in all
sexual encounters makes sex psychologically dangerous as well. It is
not the degradation, violence, and danger that makes certain
reproductive acts rape. It is the fact that women do not want to be
participating in those acts. So, it is women's voluntary participation
that constitutes the distinction between rape and sex.62
This is what the biologists tell us also. Biologists say that the
reason a woman would not want to take advantage of a potential
opportunity to reproduce is because she might be forced to invest in a
deal (i.e., a child) that is not likely to succeed, either because of bad
genetic stock (the rapist has bad genes) or lack of resources (the

59. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RAPE AND
ITS VICTIMS: A

REPORT FOR CITIZENS, HEALTH FACILITIES,

AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

AGENCIES 1 (1975)).
60. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984).
61. Some scholars have tried to articulate the distinction between rape and sex. Martha
Chamallas suggests that sexual contact is sex not rape when it is motivated by mutual desires for
procreation, emotional intimacy, or physical pleasure. Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality,
and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 784 (1988). Lois Pineau
argues that sex must be "the practice of a communicative sexuality, one which combines the
appropriate knowledge of the other with respect for the dialectics of desire." Lois Pineau, Date
Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217, 234-35 (1989). And Stephen Schulhofer
suggests that it is coercive interference with sexual autonomy that makes sex injurious.
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE
FAILURE OF LAW 118 (1998).

62. Many rapes are more physically dangerous and terrifying than more routine instances
of coercive sex and other forms of assault. I do not want to minimize the danger that many
forms of rape pose. Nonetheless, from a legal and biological standpoint, the critical distinction
between rape and sex is not physical danger to the woman; it is her lack of consent. See infra
notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
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rapist is poor and unlikely to help out).63 She also may be sacrificing

her ability to "trade sex for material benefits"' 4 and receive future
protection from the father of her child.65 The harm of rape is thus all
about the risk to women that they will lose their ability to manage
and control their endowments and investments.
To the biologist, then, it is the woman's experience that marks
the difference between rape and sex. It follows, therefore, that, for
men, rape and sex are not fundamentally different, as the law tries to
paint them. They are instead surrogates for one another. 66 For males,
the essence of the experience is about the reproductive act, regardless
of how the female is experiencing that act. In order to maximize their
reproductive success, males get access to that act in any way that they
can.
As indicated above, male primates use a variety of different
tactics to gain sexual access. Together these tactics suggest that most
reproductive encounters can actually be placed on a spectrum of
sexual coercion. Male orangutans routinely reproduce by raping.67
Male chimpanzees routinely reproduce by kidnapping, after which
the sexual encounter itself does not have to be forced. 61 Male
baboons simply keep their females from having access to any other
males and thereby secure the females' cooperation. 69 If we were to
impose human law on these primates, we would prosecute them all
for different things. The orangutans would be in jail for rape, the
chimpanzees for kidnapping, and the baboons for assault (domestic
violence). To the biologist, these distinctions would seem pointless,
though, because all of the male behaviors are about the same thing.
They are all about reproduction; they are all about the sexual act.
Thus, rape is not that different from sex just as most other acts of
male on female aggression are really not that different than rape.
Sexual coercion is not only prevalent but also the norm.
63. See Thornhill,supra note 5, at 142.
64. Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, PsychologicalAdaptation to Sexual Coercion in Victims and
Offenders, in SEX, POWER, CONFLICr, supra note 29, at 90, 92.
65. See id.
66. See Thornhill, supra note 5, at 145. Evolutionary theory suggests that men may have a
variety of rape-specific psychological adaptations including a "mechanism linking the lack of
resources (or the associated variable of a lack of sexual access to females) to the use of rape."
Id. At least one legal scholar has taken this advice to heart: "Contrary to a view held by many
feminists, rape appears to be primarily a substitute for consensual sexual intercourse rather than
a manifestation of male hostility ....
" RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 384 (1992).
67. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
6& See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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The pervasiveness of sexual coercion brings into question the
ways in which the law has criminalized coercive sex. Despite the U.S.
"[s]hort of homicide, [rape] is the
Supreme Court's insistence that
'ultimate violation of self,"' 70 the comparison to other primates
suggests that "nonviolent" forms of coercion may be just as
devastating as violent forms of coercion. It is not clear that the
experience of the female orangutan, whose solitary existence leaves
her vulnerable to violent sexual attacks by male orangutans, is all that
much worse than that of the female baboon, who lives under the
constant supervision of a male who bites her every time she so much
as glances at another male. A society that places a high value on
autonomy might well prefer the world of the female orangutan to that
of the female baboon. Who is left with more "self," the female
orangutan who spends the great majority of her time away from the
male or the female baboon who can never leave his sight?
Biology tells us that the law's construction of rape as
fundamentally different from both sex and other forms of assault is
misguided. From men's perspective, rape is not that different than
sex. From women's perspective, rape is not that different than other
forms of assault and coercion through which men routinely acquire
sex.
B.

Marriage

The law views marriage as "an association that promotes a way
of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for
as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions."' 71 Respect
for that noble purpose prevents the law from injecting itself into the
marital relationship. In order for the married way of life to thrive, the
law must leave marriages alone, so that the union born of two
individuals may come to exist as a separate entity.72 In theory, both
individuals and society benefit from the law's deference to the marital
entity. As Milton Regan explains, "Spouses... don't simply help
each other construct separate individual identities.... [T]hey
participate in the creation of a shared reality in which each partner's
70. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note
59, at 1).
71. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965).
72. For explication and critique of this legal deference to the marital entity, see Katharine
K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy by Valuing Connection, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 1523, 1529-38, 1549-58 (1998).
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identity is dependent in part on interaction with the other. 7 3
Participation in this shared identity leads to an expanded idea of self,
one in which one sacrifices for the other not because that is one's duty
but because the other is a part of oneself. 74 Justice and fairness take
on different meanings within such relationships. What is fair and just
within the family is a question of what is best for the ultimate health
of the family, not a question of what is right in terms of individual
desert or value. Thus, even if one party may deserve more than the
other, if treating the individuals as individuals and not as a part of a
unit detracts from the unity, the law eschews individual treatment. 75

The law incorporates this collectivist vision of the family in
various ways. As a matter of common law, it refuses to interfere with

ongoing marital relationships, even when one party seems to be
assuming an inappropriate amount of control. 76 Several states still
prevent spouses from suing one another in tort 77 or testifying against
each other in court. 78 The law also refuses to enforce contracts for
care between married partners on the theory that a contract to
provide such care lacks consideration because duties of care are a
part of the marital relationship. 79 Work performed within the
marriage is also nontaxable labor. 8° In addition, for years, the law
73. REGAN, supra note 49, at 94-95.
74. See LAURENCE D. HOULGATE, FAMILY AND STATE 39 (1988).
75. Various moral teachings encourage families to eschew individual treatment also. We
are taught to treat all family members equally even though some members behave much better
than others and seem to deserve better treatment. See Luke 15:11-32 (the lesson of the Prodigal

Son).
76. See McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (refusing to order the
husband to provide more for his wife because "[tihe living standards of a family are a matter of
concern to the household, and not for the courts to determine, even though the husband's
attitude toward his wife, according to his wealth and circumstances, leaves little to be said on his
behalf").
77. See, e.g., Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 24 (Fla. 1982) (upholding spousal immunity doctrine
in tort).
7& See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). Trammel held that the
testifying spouse holds the privilege not to testify, meaning that unlike other witnesses, a spouse
can choose whether or not to testify against another spouse. Id. at 52-53. The law also
privileges confidential communications between spouses. See United States v. Estes, 793 F.2d
465, 467 (2d Cir. 1986). It allows either spouse to keep the other spouse from testifying about
the content of communications that were meant to be kept confidential. See id. This privilege is
thought to promote communication between spouses and thereby solidify the marital
relationship. See id. at 467-68. Fostering that relationship is thought of as more important than
whatever truth-seeking function might be served by getting more information. See id.
79. See Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 654 (1993) (holding that a contract for
care between two spouses fails for lack of consideration); State v. Bachmann, 521 N.W.2d 886,
888 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Hughes v. Lord, 602 P.2d 1030, 1031 (N.M. 1979).
80. See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1, 44-55 (1996).
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hesitated before interfering in violent marital situations, leaving the
spouses to work it out on their own.81
To a biologist, all of this legal deference must seem quite odd

and inefficient.

Robert Trivers suggests an altogether opposite

approach to the relationship between the sexes: "One can, in effect,
treat the sexes as if they were different species, the opposite sex being

a resource relevant to producing maximum surviving offspring." 82
Bargaining between the sexes is central to the biological pair-bonding
relationship, and it is far from clear why the law should refuse to

enforce those bargains. If one party misrepresents his abilities or fails
to provide what he should provide, he has clearly breached his
obligation. By refusing to provide a remedy for such a breach, the

law refuses to enforce the contracts that are the most central to our
existence.83 By viewing the individuals within marriage as one entity,
the law allows the economically and physically stronger individuals to
coopt the labor of the weaker party. 84 Furthermore, by failing to see
caretaking work as labor worthy of legal recognition, the law ignores
the female labor that biologists see as central to the pair bond.
Moreover, to suggest that, once married, spouses no longer
perceive their interests independently, is to flatly ignore an

evolutionary history in which it is clear that both men and women
have tried to maximize their reproductive potential by deceiving their
primary partner. 85 To fail to get involved in criminal or tortious
81. See R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Wives: The Appropriate Victims of
Marital Violence, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 426, 426-32 (1978), cited in BEVERLY BALOS & MARY
LOUISE FELLOWS, LAW AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
SYSTEMS OF OPPRESSION 185 (1994).
82. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 57.
83. The law traditionally provided a remedy of sorts in the case of divorce when it awarded
alimony to a dependent spouse, but divorce was only available in cases of extreme breach.
Divorce is now more widely available, but most maintenance awards are now not grounded in a
theory of breach or compensation; they are grounded in theories of rehabilitation. See
Katharine K. Baker, Contractingfor Security: Paying Married Women What They've Earned, 55
U. CHI. L. REV. 1193, 1200-03 (1988); Silbaugh, supra note 80, at 61. The courts still fail to
reward women for the work they have done during marriage and the bargain they made upon
entering marriage.
84. Lee Teitelbaum writes, "When courts refuse to resolve intra-spousal financial disputes,
that decision is founded on the principle of family autonomy.... However, the practical
consequence ... is to confer or ratify the power of one family member over others." Lee E.
Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1174.
85. As discussed above, the consequences of diversifying mate choice-i.e., philanderingare all positive for men, and therefore, men are much more likely to stray than are women.
Nonetheless, some women have always risked the consequences of infidelity because there can
be advantages to doing so. For instance, some women stray in order to secure more resources.
See MARJORIE SHOSTAK, NISA: THE LIFE AND WORDS OF A !KUNG WOMAN 271 (1981)
(quoting a !Kung woman as saying "when you have lovers, one brings you something and
another brings you something else"). Other females may stray as a way of making sure that
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disputes between spouses is to ignore that, as Robert Wright puts it,
"a basic underlying dynamic between men and women is mutual
exploitation." 86 If the law recognized the exploitation that seems

obvious to most biologists, it would not hesitate to get involved in
incidents of family violence. Indeed, it would anticipate and be
careful to control them.
C.

Parenthood

Advances in reproductive technology and genetic science have
thrown the legal definitions of parenthood into some flux.

Traditionally, no one (save possibly the mother) was ever completely
sure of paternity, and everyone (who saw the pregnancy) was

completely sure of maternity. This led to a jurisprudence in which
marriage and support, as much as biological connection, determined
fatherhood. The husband of the mother was presumed to be the
father of the child 87 and both husband and wife were prohibited from

testifying to nonaccess.

If the mother was unmarried and the

putative father did not come forward to claim paternity, the biological
father ran the risk of losing parental rights if someone else wanted to
adopt the child. 89 The law of motherhood, on the other hand, has
always been straightforward: she who gave birth to the child was its

legal mother. 90 This is beginning to change as many state parenthood
certain males are not violent toward their offspring. See WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 69 (If a
powerful male thinks that a woman's young may be his young as well, he is less likely to aggress
against them.). Finally, other females may stray to tap into a better gene pool. See id. at 69-70.
Biologists have proposed a whole variety of theories on why women are not monogamous. See
Hrdy, supra note 28, at 128. Whatever women's incentives to stray, human male testes size
strongly suggests that women have done so. The greater a male's testes size, the greater his
sperm's chance of beating out other sperm for the precious egg. Human male testes are larger
than those of males in purely monogamous species, but somewhat smaller than those of males in
highly polygynous species. This suggests that human females have mated with multiple partners
throughout our evolutionary history. If females had not put sperm in competition with each
other, there would have been no reason for the human male testes to evolve to their current
size. See R. V. Short, Sexual Selection and Its Component Parts, Somatic and GenitalSelection,
as Illustrated by Man and the Great Apes, 9 ADVANCES STUDY BEHAV. 131, 131-38 (Jay S.
Rosenblatt et al. eds., 1979).
86. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 58.
87. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding, in the face of contrary
biological evidence, California's presumption that the husband of the mother is the father of the
child); Mary Louise Fellows, The Law of Legitimacy: An Instrument of Procreative Power, 3
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 495,498 (1993).
8& See Fellows, supra note 87, at 498-99.
89. This is still the case. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
90. The first surrogate motherhood case decided in this country adopted this framework.
See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (awarding parental rights to the biological father
and surrogate mother).
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statutes and judicial opinions are starting to incorporate the
technological advances that allow us to determine absolutely the
genetic father of a child 9' and to separate completely the genetic and

gestational work of motherhood. 92 These changes often show an
increased willingness to let genetics be the determinant factor in
parenthood. 93
The fact that the law is in flux as a result of scientific advances
makes it all the more important to analyze the intersection of legal
and biological meanings of parenthood. In law, once maternity and
paternity have been decided, they are seen as equivalents. Each
parent has an equal right, at birth, to the custody of the child 94 and
each parent has an equal right to block the adoption of the child. 95 No
distinction is made between mothers and fathers in custody decisions
in cases of divorce. 96 States either presume that parents should share
custody 97 or that both parents are, at least as a presumptive matter,
equally capable of providing for the children's best interest. 98 Once
the initial decision regarding custody is made, the noncustodial parent
has the right to invoke the state's authority to monitor the parenting
91. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/11(a) (West 1999) ("As soon a practicable, the
court... may ... and upon request of a party shall, order or direct the mother, child and alleged
father to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests to determine inherited characteristics.").
92. States are not in agreement about what to do once they separate out these concepts.
For example, North Dakota defines the mother as the woman who donated genetic material to
the child. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-19-01(6) (1997). In Virginia, the gestational mother is the
mother of the child. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(1) (Michie 1995). In Johnson v. Calvert, the
California Supreme Court awarded maternal rights to the biological mother instead of the
gestational mother of the child on the theory that it was the biological mother who intended to
mother. 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (in bane).
93. See In re J. W. T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Tex. 1994). In In re J. W. T., the Texas
Supreme Court allowed a biological father to establish paternity notwithstanding the
presumption of paternity in the mother's husband. Id. at 198. The court noted that science had
become "'the supreme arbiter' of paternity." Id. at 193 (quoting John J. Sampson, Title 2.
Parentand Child, 17 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1065, 1151 (1986)).
94. See 2 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 20.4, at 496 (2d ed. 1987).
95. See UNIF. ADOPTION Acr § 2-401, 9 U.L.A. 49 (1999) (requiring both mother and
father to consent to the adoption).
96. The tender years doctrine, which routinely awarded custody of a child of tender
(young) years to the mother, replaced a paternal preference rule in the nineteenth century. See
CLARK, supra note 94, § 20.4, at 496-97. The doctrine, in turn, gave way to the best interest of
the child standard, which makes the law neutral as to mothers and fathers. See id. § 20.4, at 498;
FINEMAN, supra note 15, at 77.
97. A presumption in favor of joint custody exists in 26 states plus the District of Columbia.
See Joint Custody Legislation in the U.S. (visited Jan. 27, 2000) <http://www.vix.com/crc/
research/legislation.html>. But see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(b) (West 1999).
98. Most states use the best interest of the child standard in determining who should
receive custody. For a summary of the major critiques of the standard, see Carl E. Schneider,
Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard,89 MICH. L.
REV. 2215, 2219-97 (1991).
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work that the other parent is doing. 99
Again, to the biologists, this legal construction of parenthood
must seem somewhat odd.
Biologists view motherhood and
fatherhood as wholly different experiences. Critically, biologists view
motherhood as a vastly more resource-intensive endeavor with regard
to both absolute labor and opportunity costs. The initial female
investment in a child is much greater than the male's. Her gamete is
much bigger and more costly than his; she contributes all of the
gestational resources, while he contributes none; and it is she who is
usually responsible for meeting the child's needs during the
(particularly) long period of dependency that defines human
childhood. All of this mothering labor is critical to our collective
survival, but the law seems to ignore it when it equates motherhood
and fatherhood. 10 0
In addition, the law seems to ignore the evolutionary pressure
(not to mention the abundant contemporary evidence)1°1 suggesting
that men are less inclined than women to invest in children. 1°2 Some
men may be willing to so invest, but given the tendency men have to
focus less on each child,10 3 it seems odd that the law would presume
that both parents are equally fit to caretake.
Finally, the law ignores differentials in the cost of losing a child.
A male can, at relatively low cost, create another child. He can
continue to do this, with only mildly decreased fertility rates, well into
his seventies. For a female, because her eggs are so much more costly
than sperm in terms of body resources, and so much more precious
than sperm in terms of years of availability, the loss of a child is a very
serious loss. Once she spends any time rearing a child, she has
incurred huge, often prohibitive opportunity costs that can prevent
99. See Baker, supra note 72, at 1545-48.
100. It is worth noting that we must rely on normative systems, like the law, instead of our
genes if we are to care about our collective survival. Genes are concerned only with their own
survival. See DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 2. The early evolutionists "got it totally and utterly
wrong.... They made the erroneous assumption that the important thing in evolution is the
good of the species (or the group) rather than the good of the individual (or the gene)." Id.
101. There are many studies documenting how parents allocate domestic chores, including
caretaking. Every study indicates that women spend significantly more time caretaking than do
men. For a discussion of these reports, see ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE
SECOND SHIFTr: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 271-78 (1989). Tamar
Lewin reports that the average American woman spends 11.5 years of her working life
caretaking, while the average man spends six months. Tamar Lewin, Aging Parents:Women's
Burden Grows, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1989, at Al (quoting Joan Kuriansky, Executive Director
of the Older Women's League, a nonprofit advocacy group).
102 See supra notes 22, 101 and accompanying text.
103. See DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 147.
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her from parenting again. Thus, the cost of losing a child in a custody
battle is likely to be much greater for her than for him. 10 4
This disparity in biological opportunity costs not only gives
mothers a more compelling equitable claim to custody, it throws into
question the law's protection of genetic paternity. If another adult
came forward and willingly provided resources for a dependent child,
it is hard to see why the biological father should be entitled to
interfere with the parenting rights of the biological mother and her
chosen parenting partner. Effective parenting has as much to do with
providing resources, both emotional and physical, as it has to do with
providing genetic material. By not providing for the woman with
whom he mated, the biological father has breached the implicit
mating bargain. Moreover, because he can so readily make more
offspring, the cost to him of not receiving parental rights is
comparatively small.
In sum then, biologists must look quizzically at the laws of rape,
marriage, and parenthood. The law insists that rape is different than
sex, when biologically, at least to men, they are the same act. The law
draws bright lines between rape and other forms of assault and
coercion even when all these acts, at least to women, render the
sexual act involuntary. In marriage, the law creates a fictional unity
between two people whose biological interests are best served by
exploiting each other. In honoring that unity, the law privileges the
party who is best able to exploit the other. With regard to
parenthood, the law dismisses the importance of maternal labor,
disregards men's disinclination to invest in children, and ignores the
greater cost that women bear in losing a child. Thus, if anything, the
law exacerbates rather than alleviates the power imbalance that
nature created between men and women.

III. LESSONS
At least two important lessons can be drawn from the biological
perspective on law offered above. The first is that feminists have
104. Biologists would probably argue that as long as the other parent can be ensured that
the child will be cared for, neither of them will be really hurt by losing the child in a custody
battle. See DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 148. But, biologists would also acknowledge that
women are more likely than men to develop deep emotional attachments to children because it
was more reproductively beneficial for them to do so. Thus, even if losing a custody battle will
not impair a female's reproductive success, it is likely that she will be more emotionally hurt by
the loss of a child. See Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 142-58 (1992).

CHICAGO-KENTLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:805

been fighting for all the right reforms. The second is that feminists
must not stop at these reforms. In this Part, I explore what these
lessons mean for rape, marriage, and parenthood.
My argument is that biology's findings can support feminist
visions, not that biology necessarily proves that feminist solutions are
the correct ones normatively. Biology's claims are descriptive, not
normative. If biology proves anything, it is with regard to facts.105
However, those facts (if proven) are deeply disturbing. Indeed, they
are facts that most people, feminist or not, biologist or not,
normatively evaluate as inequitable and harsh. 1°6 It is the law's job to
channel that normative evaluation into cultural norms and rules that
curb the inequity and harshness. Thus, biology's facts support
feminist visions because biology's facts make us keenly aware of how
imperative normative visions are.
A.

Legal Reforms

With regard to rape, the biological model suggests that the
presence of physical violence is incidental-not central-to the crime

of rape. Consent is the critical issue, as feminist law reformers have
long recognized. 107 For years, the law required physical signs of
resistance as a way of proving nonconsent, but biology makes clear
that consent and acquiescence are very different things. Many
females acquiesce to sex only after being kidnapped, assaulted, or
physically and emotionally harassed. Sex for a woman under these
circumstances should be considered every bit as injurious as it is for
the woman who is raped by the man who jumps out of the bushes
with a knife. It is the victim's lack of consent that demarcates rape,
and the biological account suggests that there are a myriad of
situations in which women say yes to sex only because they have no
meaningful choice.
105. I am grateful to Owen Jones for highlighting this qualification for me and pointing out
how important the normative/descriptive distinction is at this juncture.
106. For biologists who recognize just how disturbing biology's facts are, see DAWKINS,
supra note 12; Smuts, supra note 10, at 1-32. For nonfeminists who recognize just how necessary
it is to superimpose social norms on biology's facts, see WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 375-78.
107. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 61, at 31-33. As a strategic matter, the reformers
disagreed over whether it was better to define rape simply as sex without consent or to focus on
the behavior of the assailant. See id. at 31. Those who did not want to make consent the central
issue at trial worried that a focus on the woman's state of mind would end up being a trial about
the woman's dress, demeanor, and past history, not about her actual state of mind. See id. at 25.
Rape shield laws were attempts to prevent the consent issue from being swallowed up in an
indictment of the rape victim's past history. See id.
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This abundant absence of meaningful choice for women explains
why Catharine MacKinnon is at least sometimes right when she says
that "for women it is difficult to distinguish [between rape and
intercourse] under conditions of male dominance."' 1 8 It is also why
Stephen Schulhofer's new proposal to criminalize any act of sexual
penetration to which a woman has consented only after being
threatened with losing something to which she is otherwise entitled (a
job, reputation, right to receive services for which she has paid, an
education, etc.) is a significant step forward. I°9 Figuring out whether
she said "yes" or "no" is less important than analyzing the (often
coercive) circumstances under which the intercourse took place. Like
female chimps, gorillas, and baboons, female humans often only
consent because they have to.
In addition, the biological account suggests that, to the extent
that the law and popular ideology have demonized rapists as
psychopaths, they have badly misinterpreted the realities of rape."10
One of the few cross-cultural surveys on attitudes about rape found
that respondents (residents of a large metropolitan city) think that a
perpetrator's mental illness is the primary cause of rape."' In passing
federal evidentiary rule amendments that allow prior convictions of
rapists (but not other criminals) to be admitted into evidence,
proponents argued that rapists constitute a "small class of depraved
criminals."1" 2 Studies of convicted and potential rapists suggest, as
biologists would predict, to the contrary. Researchers consistently
fail to find evidence of mental abnormality or illness in rapist
populations."'
Various different studies have found that
approximately twenty-five percent of college age men admit to having
participated in coercive sex," 4 and other studies suggest that more
108. MACKINNON, supra note 13, at 174.
109. SCHULHOFER, supra note 61, at 283-84.
110. See generally Katharine K. Baker, Once A Rapist? Motivational Evidence and
Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 576-78 (1997).
111. See JOYCE E. WILLIAMS & KAREN A. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT: RAPE AND
PUBLIC ATrITUDES 118 (1981).
112. David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probabilityin Sex Offense Cases and Other
Cases, 70 Cm-KENT L. REv. 15, 24 (1994). Karp's remarks in this article were incorporated
into the legislative history of what was later codified as Federal Rule of Evidence 412. See 140
CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari); see also FED. R.
EVID. 412.
113. See Lucy W. M. Taylor, The Role of Offender Profiling in Classifying Rapists:
Implicationsfor Counseling,6 COUNSELING PSYCHOL. Q. 325, 334 (1993).
114. See John Briere & Neil M. Malamuth, Self-Reported Likelihood of Sexually Aggressive
Behavior: Attitudinal Versus Sexual Explanations, 17 J_ RES. PERSONALITY 315, 318 (1983)
(finding that 28% of subjects indicated likelihood of raping); Mary P. Koss et al., The Scope of
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men would rape if they knew they would not get caught.11 5 If, as the
biologists maintain, rape is not that different from sex, then it would
make sense that a sizable number of men would view the two acts
interchangeably. Men continue to see rape and sex as substitutes.
This finding suggests, as I have argued elsewhere, that real rape
reform requires more than just penalizing all rapists. It requires
creative and expansive policies aimed at decreasing the motivation
for rape, eradicating the rapist-as-psychopath myth, and helping men
11 6
internalize the wrong of all forms of rape.
With regard to marriage and legal deference to the marital entity,
the biological model leads one to question, as feminists have, the
purpose and legitimacy of the public/private divide. As Elizabeth
Schneider summarizes:
[Pirivacy has been viewed as problematic by feminists theorists.
Privacy has seemed to rest on a division of public and private that
has been oppressive to women and has supported male dominance
in the family. Privacy reinforces
the idea that the personal is
11 7
separate from the political.

By drawing a boundary around the marital entity and refusing to
recognize the bargaining and the work that goes on within that entity,
the law renders much of what women do legally worthless and
invisible.11 8 Biology, like feminism, suggests that the dismissal of
women's work ignores the central role that bargaining plays within
marriages.
Thus biology, like feminism, suggests that contracts
between spouses should be enforced, that household labor should be
taxed, and that at divorce women should be compensated for what
they have earned both in terms of household contribution and

Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a NationalSample of
Higher Education Students, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 162, 166 (1987) (finding
that 25.1% of men engaged in some form of sexual aggression).
115. See Todd Tieger, Self-Rated Likelihood of Raping and the Social Perception of Rape, 15
J. RES. PERSONALITY 147, 154 (1981) (finding that 64 out of 172 males indicated "some
likelihood of raping").
116. For more on this, see infra text accompanying notes 127-33.
117. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 979 (1991); see
also Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 295-97 (S. I. Benn & G. F. Gaus eds., 1983). "[Feminists] have
shown how the family is a major concern of the state and how, through legislation concerning
marriage and sexuality and the policies of the welfare state, the subordinate status of women is
presupposed by and maintained by the power of the state." Pateman, supra, at 297.
118. "The fact that the law in general has so little bearing on women's day-to-day concerns
reflects and underscores their insignificance."
Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 151,156 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
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investment in human capital.119
The biological perspective also suggests that the normative goal
of marital deference is ill advised. Men and women cannot become
one because they are independent beings motivated by their own
selfish genes. The law tries to make men and women become one in
marriage, but in doing so it turns a blind eye to the sexual power
differential that is obvious to most biologists. To treat husband and
wife as one for evidentiary, tort, and domestic violence purposes
keeps the true dynamics of male-female relationships hidden. It
reinforces men's ability to suppress the inevitable conflict between
men and women. 120 As Fran Olsen suggests, the legal "taboo on
inquiring into the quality of male-female relationships may be based
more on a fear of exposing systematic inequality than on anything
else.' 2' Observing those relationships as a matter of course in their
work, biologists take for granted what feminists have always
maintained, that the personal is political.
With regard to parenthood, the biological model brings into
question legal rules regarding custody and parental rights. Biologists
think of parenting as a costly but necessary investment. The
biological differences between women and men make it inevitable
that women will invest more than men initially and highly likely that
women will invest more than men throughout the child's period of
dependence. Biological differences also make it inevitable that
mothers suffer more at the loss of a child than do fathers. Cultural
gender norms may amplify and exaggerate these biological
differences with regard to both physical and emotional investment in
children, but, even without that cultural overlay, science suggests that
mothers work much harder at parenting than do fathers.
Accordingly, as both Mary Becker and Martha Fineman have argued,
mothers should be given preferential status as parents. 122 The
biological model supports maternal deference standards in custody
determinations23 and definitions of family that focus on the motherchild dyad rather than the sexual union.124
119. For a review of all of these arguments, see Silbaugh, supra note 80, at 79-86.
120. See Becker, supra note 14, at 183 ("Men have an obvious incentive to suppress conflict
to preserve the status quo-in which they enjoy a disproportionate share of economic and
physical security, leisure time, status, power and sexual satisfaction.").
121. Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 835, 857 n.57 (1985).
122. Becker, supra note 104, at 142-58; FINEMAN, supra note 15, at 88-89.
123. See Becker, supra note 104, at 142-58.
124. See FINEMAN, supra note 15.
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In addition, the biological model suggests that statutes conferring
fatherhood on men who contribute genetic material instead of on
men (or women) who contribute resources to a needy pregnant or
postpartum mother are misplaced. The gamete is just one kind of
investment that an adult can make in a child. Often, the more costly
investment comes with meeting the needs of a mother rendered
dependent by pregnancy and child rearing.125 Thus, as Barbara
Woodhouse argues, the gestational father (the person who supports
the mother during pregnancy and beyond), not the genetic father,
126
should be the one on whom the law confers parental status.
B. Normative Visions
Perhaps the most important lesson that biology teaches us is that
even with most of these reforms in place, the world will still not be
one in which we truly wish to live. Even if all forms of sexual
coercion are made criminal, even if women's bargains and work in
marriage are respected as work, and even if women do get greater
parental rights, the most we will have accomplished is a more just way
of adjudicating nature's inequities. We want more than that.
For instance, in simply declaring rape the opposite of sex, the law
ignores the more subtle ways in which sexual coercion operates. We
cannot afford to do this, but neither should we stop once we punish
all men who exploit women to get sex. There is value in viewing sex
as a private, symbolic expression between two individuals. There is
value in thinking of sex as an experience of mutual communicative
pleasure, 27 one in which each party is motivated as much by a desire
to share as by a desire to "win" or "score" or even procreate. There
is value in viewing sex as truly different than rape. If we honor these
values, our goal must be to change what many men (and some
women) want from sex. We need to manipulate, not merely cabin,
125. See id. at 163 ("The very process of assuming caretaking responsibilities creates
dependency in the caretaker-she needs some social structure to provide the means to care for
others."). The adult dependency created by meeting the dependency needs of offspring is one
thing that distinguishes humans from other primates. Most primate females are able to feed
both themselves and their young without relying on anyone else. See Smuts, supra note 10, at
15.
126. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1748-865 (1993). Given the importance of
gestational labor, the biological model may also suggest that a gestational surrogate should have
a greater claim to parenthood than a mother who merely donates an egg. Cf. Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993) (holding that the woman who donated the egg, not the
woman who carried the fetus, was the mother of the child).
127. See Chamallas, supra note 61, at 836-39.
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men's biological appetites. 128
Various cultures have done this before. The ancient Greeks
encouraged men to have strong sexual desires as long as they satisfied
them in the act of penetration. 129 Stigma depended on whether one
was active or passive, not on with whom one was active or passive. In
order to consummate their close relationships with other men, Greek
males thrust between the tightly clenched thighs of their male
lovers.130 These male/male relationships were often the most
affectionate and emotionally meaningful relationships in the lives of
Greek men.13 1 Thus, the most honored and important sexual
interactions were those that, from a biological perspective, made no
sense at all.
What this historical example shows us is not that we should
return to a world in which active penetration is the mark of healthy
sexuality, but that it is possible to define healthy sexuality in a
manner that completely ignores reproductive success. Mutuality (of
pleasure, commitment, and communication), not intercourse, should
define sex, and coercion, not violence, should define rape. If we
substituted mutuality for penetration as the defining principle of
sexual interaction, it would no longer make sense to substitute rape
for sex. To affect this change though, we have to alter men's desire
for sex as currently understood. This means manipulating men's
desire to engage in rape not just by punishing rape but by making
men understand and desire a sex defined by mutuality. 32 If we can
change the social meaning of sex, some men may continue to rape,
but far fewer men will desire coercive sex. A clear distinction
between rape and sex can make sense, as it should, only if we change
our social world such that rape and sex are completely different
things.
With regard to marriage, there is disagreement about what
128. For more on the various ways in which we might manipulate men's sexual appetites, see
Katharine K. Baker, Unwanted Supply, Unwanted Demand, 3 GREEN BAG 103, 105-13 (1999).
129. See Martha C. Nussbaum, ConstructingLove, Desire, and Care, in SEX, PREFERENCE,
AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON LAW AND NATURE 17, 28 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum
eds., 1997).
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663,664 (1999).
In order to alter the belief that nonconsensual sex is a substitute for consensual sex, we
need to move beyond a sense that nonconsensual sex is wrong and toward a
recognition that it is truly "other." It will not become "other" until we understand the
social meaning of the act differently.
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feminism's normative goals might be. Some feminists want to
redefine who should be able to enjoy the benefits of marriage,
including privacy protection; 133 other feminists want to abolish the
notion of marriage and privacy altogether.134 Those who see value in
marriage see value in living a life so blended with another that one

views the other and gives to the other as a part of oneself. They see
value in alternative systems of justice that rely less on abstract

principles and more on situational dynamics.135 Certainly the work of
Carol Gilligan,1 36 Nel Noddings, I37 and other relational feminists 38
suggests that these traditionally female notions of connection and
justice are worthy of emulation.
Nonetheless, to pursue the feminist benefits of marital privilege
without being aware of the potential risks that marriage creates is
folly. To treat the notion of interdependence as more important than
physical safety, as the law traditionally did in its approach to domestic

violence, is clearly wrong. To prevent women from suing on contracts
in which they promised to provide domestic caretaking services in

return for favorable testamentary provisions, when those domestic
caretaking services are readily available in external markets, also
133. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 809, 816 (1998) ("[Mlarriage is worth strengthening because its popularity and its
associations with familial responsibility and commitment to others make it too beneficial a
resource to abandon."); Robin West, Universalism, Liberal Theory, and the Problem of Gay
Marriage,25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 705, 727 (1998).
The right of the individual to marry within his sex is covered by the same right of
privacy that protects the individual's right to marry outside his race, to take birth
control, or to procure an abortion. It goes to the heart of our right to make
fundamental decisions regarding our individual lives.
West, supra, at 727; see also Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy,
Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender, B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 89, on file with author) ("Acknowledging scholars' concerns about the atomization of
law and society as significant and in some ways negative, the quest for marriage by same-gender
couples can be seen as clearly positive.").
134. See FINEMAN, supra note 15, at 4-5 (proposing that all relationships between adults be
nonlegal and therefore nonprivileged.); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask for: Why
Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in
Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1535-36 (1993) (arguing that marriage will perpetuate
gender stereotypes); cf. Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A
Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643,
1652-66 (1993) (arguing for gay marriage but against the use of privacy doctrine).
135. See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 22-93 (1997).
136. CAROL GILLIGAN: IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT 24-63 (1982); Carol Gilligan, Reply to Critics,in AN ETHIC OF CARE: FEMINIST
AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 207 (Mary Jeanne Larrabee ed., 1993).
137. NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS & MORAL EDUCATION
(1984).
13& See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39,39-42 (1985).
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seems quite wrong. Indeed, such holdings arguably undermine the
institution of marriage by suggesting that a woman is better off
divorcing her husband and then bargaining with him than bargaining
with him within marriage. Refusing to provide women who work in
the home with various forms of social insurance 39 comparably
suggests more of an assumption that women are necessarily beholden
to men than a desire to encourage interdependence among equals.

Much of the work that women do within families cannot be
bought

and sold in an external

market, however.

Spouses

(particularly women) have always provided a forum for intimacy by
allowing their partners to feel less atomized, more emotional, and

more connected to others. 140 This work-which is the work of
intimacy-and the feelings it engenders should be recognized as
important, possibly even crucial, to our collective well-being. But it is

not clear that the law should put a price tag on it or view marriage as
a contract for its provision.141 By viewing marriage as an exchange
between two people, we may destroy the fusion of self, which
marriage is supposed to represent.1 42 In failing to acknowledge the

extent to which the interests of men and women conflict, the law
blinds itself to the extent to which men exploit women's labor in
marriage.

But if we legitimate the biological perspective, which

presumes that the interests of men and women conflict, we abandon
the normative insights of much of cultural feminism.
At present, the profound economic and political disparity
between men and women may make the privacy that marriage affords
139. See Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination,Social Security, and
Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 264 (1989)
(explaining the various ways in which the social security system fails to address adequately the
work that women do within the home); see also Silbaugh, supra note 80, at 72-79 (describing the
home and housework exceptions to the NLRA, OSHA and Worker's Compensation
regulations).
140. See Baker, supra note 72, at 1551-56.
141. For general discussions of the problems associated with commodifying what we tend to
think of as incommensurable goods, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUES IN ETHICS AND
ECONOMICS 44-64 (1993); Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43
DUKE L.J. 56 (1993); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849
(1987).
142. Viewing relationships between the sexes as matters of exchange hinders the
construction of a shared identity because the notion of exchange itself suggests that the self is
separate from the goods or commodities being exchanged. See Robin L. West, Legitimatingthe
Illegitimate:A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1442, 1451 (1993). For instance,
in a typical exchange, an individual might trade salt for sugar because she wants to enjoy more
sugar and is willing to cope with less salt. In contrast, in an ideal relationship (at least the ideal
as embodied in much legal doctrine), one party gives salt and the other gives sugar in order to
create something new, something the very existence of which will alter the identities of the
parties themselves. See REGAN, supra note 48, at 63.
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too dangerous. If women do not have the political or economic
power to live and procreate on their own, without becoming
dependent on men in marriage, then it is all too easy for the unity that
marriage creates to become a unity in which, as Blackstone said, "the
very being and [legal] existence of the woman... is... entirely...
incorporated in that of the husband.' ' 43 But our goal should not be to
destroy the idea of unity. It may be worth retaining certain marital
privileges, like nonintentional spousal tort immunity and the
communication and testimonial privileges, in order to support the
ideal of unity, even if in doing so we potentially hinder a woman's
chance for vindication against a wrongful spouse. It may be worth
accepting the law's refusal to interfere with economic distributions
within marriage while that marriage is ongoing. 144 It may be
important to maintain property distribution and maintenance rules
that assume a blending of interests and award property and
maintenance at divorce based on a model of ongoing reciprocity, not
individual self-fulfillment. 145 Most important, the ideal of unity
suggests that economic and political parity' 46 should be seen as a
prerequisite for, not an impediment to, loving and selfless and
honorable marriages.
When both parties are capable of
independence yet opt instead for a life of interdependence, the union
formed is far less likely to fall victim to one-sided exploitation. This
recognition, in turn, suggests that we should view marriage between
same-sex couples as not merely compatible with, but as the ideal for,
147
heterosexual marriage.
Integrating a feminist normative vision for parenthood into the
contemporary legal regime is also difficult. 148 By ignoring mothers'
greater physical and emotional investment in parenthood, the law
143. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *433.
144. See McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953).
145. This would suggest that income sharing, not foregone opportunities, contribution, or
rehabilitation, should be the principle underlying property distribution and maintenance.
Compare JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICr AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 114-41 (2000) (arguing in favor of equalizing the incomes of the two
post-divorce households), and Ira Mark Eliman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3
(1989) (suggesting that alimony compensates a spouse for her residual loss of earning capacity).
146. For innovative ways in which we might achieve this political parity in the short term,
see Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Equality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 21. Becker suggests that political parity might be achieved through campaign finance
reform, proportionate and semiproportionate voting, and votes for children. Id.
147. See West, supra note 133, at 726-29.
148. Katharine Bartlett and Carol Stack recognized this some time ago. Katharine T.
Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 9-11 (1986) (arguing that it was too soon to abandon the idea of joint custody).
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does women a disservice, but it is not clear that the feminist goal for

parenthood should be one in which motherhood is exalted over
fatherhood. At present, women choose to and do mother much more
than men father, but women might well prefer to do less mothering.

This is true for two reasons. First, as the biologists well recognize,
parenting is work. Women should be compensated for this work, but
not conscripted into doing it. In a 1985 study of a cross-section of
American mothers, "[a]lmost half reported that day-to-day
1 ' 49
responsibilities of motherhood were more drudgery than pleasure.
We need to be careful in what we ask for. Second, given the extent to
which women are socialized to parent, it is likely that our social

norms greatly exaggerate whatever biological inclinations women
have to mother. As one woman wrote to the New York Times:
"When my husband and I walk out the door in the morning and hear

a child cry, the reason I want to turn back and he does not is that
150
society tells me I am a bad mother if I work outside the home."'

Social norms may encourage women to overinvest in their children.,,,
Caretakers that invest too heavily in their children are not necessarily
doing themselves or their children much good,

52

and they are

allowing men who do not invest as heavily in caretaking to continue
15 3
to monopolize the distribution of resources and political power.

149. Louis E. GENEVIE & EVA MARGOLIES, THE MOTHERHOOD REPORT: How
MOTHERS REALLY FEEL ABOUT BEING MOTHERS 16 (1987).
150. Peggy Tarvin, Letter to the Editor, Baby Doll Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at
A14.
151. It was not until the nineteenth century that women even had the opportunity to devote
the kind of time to children that "mothering" is thought to require today. See NANCY F. CoTT,
THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMEN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835, at 26-27
(1977). When the household was the critical locus of food and textile production, women were
far too busy producing necessary goods to give children the kind of individualized caretaking
that we idealize today. Moreover, working class women have always been responsible for both
production and reproduction.
152. Mothers who work outside the home often indicate that their work acts as a buffer
against the strains and anxieties of parenting. See ROSALIND C. BARNETT & CARYL RIVERS,
SHE WORKS, HE WORKS: How TWO-INCOME FAMILIES ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND
BETTER-OFF 56-59, 114-26 (1996). Various childhood experts suggest that children suffer when
they are isolated in the world of privatized caretaking. Such children are at risk for becoming
overinvested in their caretakers and underinvested in the world around them. See BEATRICE B.
WHITING & JOHN W. M. WHITING, CHILDREN OF SIX CULTURES 106 (1975); Sarane Spence
Boocock, Children in Contemporary Society, in RETHINKING CHILDHOOD: PERSPECTIVES ON
DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 414, 432-34 (Arlene Skolnick ed., 1976).
153. See PAULA ENGLAND & GEORGE FARKAS, HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT, AND
GENDER 55 (1986) ("[M]en typically make fewer relationship-specific investments than women,
accumulating instead resources which are as useful outside as within their current
relationship."); Katharine K. Baker, Taking Care of Our Daughters,18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1495,
1517 (1997) (book review) ("[W]hen one person invests in caretaking... she significantly
weakens her ability to compete publicly with one who has not so invested."); Smuts, supra note
10, at 1-32 (providing an evolutionary analysis of how men came to control resources and
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If we adopt strong maternal preference standards and/or redefine
our notion of family so that it centers on the mother-child dyad, we
reinforce the division of labor that nature laid out for us. Ignoring the
reality of that division when it stares us in the face is unjust, but
endorsing the legitimacy of that division by codifying it in law may be
unwise. If what women want is not just recognition for the work they
do but also help with the work they do, we must do more than just
compensate mothers. We must motivate fathers. Just as we must
change the social meaning of sex such that rape and sex are, as
socially understood, incompatible not substitutable, so must we
change the social meaning of parenthood such that fatherhood and
motherhood are substitutable. If fatherhood were understood to be
more about self-sacrifice and emotional investment and less about
genetic and financial contribution, women might have to do much less
caretaking.
These kinds of changes cannot happen overnight, but the law can
facilitate them. Mandatory paternity leave, or at least leave that must
be split between two parents if it is to be taken, can help integrate
men into the crucial initial stages of child rearing. 1 4 State-subsidized
caretaking markets can help equalize the investments of men and
women in their children. Laws that preference emotional investment
over genetic contribution also place the appropriate emphasis on the
actual work that parenting involves. Biology makes motherhood
different from fatherhood. If we want to change that biological
reality, we must work hard to do so.
CONCLUSION

The biological perspective helps us see what we know. It reveals
how our legal rules ignore the current inevitability of rape, the
exploitation inherent in gender dynamics and the work of
parenthood. In doing so, it not only confirms the existence of
patriarchy, but also demonstrates that patriarchy is the norm in many
species. Given the normalcy of patriarchy, it should come as no
surprise that a legal system designed and, until quite recently,
controlled exclusively by men has not served women well.
political power).
154. See RHONA MAHONEY, KIDDING OURSELVES 105 (1995) (describing patterns by
which couples allow the first caretaker to become the primary caretaker); Martin H. Malin,
Fathers and ParentalLeave, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1047, 1055 (1994) (stating that, once the mother
stays home initially, it becomes more efficient and emotionally easy for her to become the
primary caretaker).
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Acknowledging both the normality of patriarchy and the failure
of the law to control its inequities need not leave feminists
pessimistic, however. Indeed, we can use biological insights to bolster
the legitimacy of our claims. Biology's facts parallel our description
of the world around us, and those facts often suggest that our
concrete attempts to change the law make sense. Biology also
reinforces our normative call to affect changes far deeper than legal
reform.
If the biologists are right, our genes instruct us to be deeply
problematic characters. Men, in particular, are biologically inclined
to be violent and selfish toward each other, toward women, and
toward most children. If all we have asked for thus far is haven from
this violent and selfish male behavior, then we have not asked for
nearly enough. With all due deference to Simone de Beauvoir,
biology makes clear that the work of feminism must not be limited to
creating a world in which women are born and not made.'55 The work
of feminism must include taking the men that are born and making
them better.

155. See SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 267 (H. M. Parshley ed. & trans., David

Campbell Publishers Ltd. 1989) (1952).

